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W c could  recom m end Prague Spring  
for reading m ainly  as an inform ative 
book w ith  p len ty  o f w hat in  Australia 
are unknow n facts, details, data and 
figures. T h e  readers certainly w ill ap­
preciate the short chronology of Cze­
choslovak events given at the end of 
this useful book.
A l e s  B e n d a
(Mr. Benda, a journalist on the  
Czech paper “Youth Front” visited  
Australia as a guest o f the Y oung Soci­
alist League in  May this year.—Ed.)
ON ESCALATION: 
METAPHORS AND  
SCENARIOS, by Herman 
Kahn. Penguin,
300 pp., $1.65.
H E R M A N  K A H N , a m athem atician  
rum oured to have an IQ o f over 200, 
once referred to h im self as an “am ateur 
strategist”. B u t since the conditional 
acceptance of his style o f strategy by  
the US adm inistration he has m oved  
in to  the lucrative and powerfield of 
prediction and pontificating — his H u d ­
son Institute team  is now  “investigat­
in g ” the twenty-first century. However, 
in  greater m easure even than sim ilar  
general theories o f the Buckm inister  
F’uller/M arshall M cLuhan type, Kahn 
trades in  errors o f fact and in  genera­
lisation so loose it can be shown to be 
untrue (see. the discussion of h is first 
two books in  D issen t, X , i, 1963).
On E scalation  is a work so crowded  
w ith  characteristic Kahn shortsighted­
ness and general lack of p o litical 
awareness it  becom es difficult to know  
where to begin  discussing them . As 
in  his earlier works these faults stem  
prim arily from the type o f anti-senti- 
m ental stand h e adopts, for by facing  
the fact that w e m ust think  of what 
w ould be involved in  nuclear war 
he forgets individuals or societies com ­
pletely  and assumes, in  their stead, 
a potentia l p u b lic  tolerance of w ide­
spread disaster. T hus
“T oday our strategic forces are so 
hardened and dispersed that m any  
analysts b elieve the US could give the  
Soviets days to try to destroy these 
forces and they w ould not be able to 
do so. T herefore, there need b e  no  
rush for the President to retaliate. H e  
could  w ait u n til the attack was fin­
ished and then  decide on the nature 
of the  retaliation . For exam ple, he  
could  com m unicate w ith  the Soviets 
to find ou t if  the attack was accidental 
or deliberate before striking back. (p. 
6 5) . ”
As though  to underline the naivete  
of expecting the necessary tolerance of 
such a situation , Kahn, at other points 
in  the same book, lists b oth  Pearl 
H arbor and the sinking of the Lusitania 
as “in tense” (i.e. likely to start a war) 
“crises”.
But it seems K ahn’s style to be so 
rash. For instance four pages p re­
viously  h e is sim ilarly naive before  
the US G overnm ent “L ine” on  the  
T on k in  G ulf Incident. After quoting  
a single article from T h e W ashington  
P ost o f 10/7 /64 , headed “US R eprisal 
R aids on N orth  V ietnam  Kept as Last 
R esort,” K ahn writes:
“Since the above was obviously ‘leak­
ed ’, it  was likely to be understood by 
H anoi and Peking as semiofficial, if  
n ot official. It w ould b e difficult to 
give a m ore detailed, specific and e x ­
pository threat and account o f the  
theory. H owever, the extent to w hich  
such stories m ay have in fluenced  the  
behaviour o f H anoi and Peking is an 
open  issue. It clearly did n ot prevent 
the later attack on US destroyers in  
T on k in  Bay.”
T o  have leaped from any one report 
to th is conclusion w ould h av e  been  
absurd, even had the report been  
dated as late as Ju ly  31. In  fact the  
23 days betw een the report and th e  
T on k in  G ulf Incident included separ­
ate appeals for a reconvened Geneva 
Conference from the Soviet U nion , U
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T hant and D e G aulle as w ell as NLF  
interest. But on  2 6 /7 /6 4  Saigon d e­
nounced such proposals (only a day 
after Johnson had stated “W e do not 
believe in  conferences called to ratify  
terror, so our policy is unchanged”); 
on 29 /7 /65  General Khanh of South  
Vietnam called for a "march to the 
N orth” and the same period included  
at least two North Vietnam ese reports 
of US interference in  the T on k in  G ulf 
area. On the strength of com pletely  
ignored contem porary actions and  
statem ents Kahn’s belief in  T he W ash­
ington Post as som e form of lay h o t­
line m ust be discounted even should  
the reader accept the attack as u n ­
provoked or the alliance betw een  
H anoi and Peking both obvious and  
strong. (In his discussion of the  
“Phony W ar” of September ’39 — May 
’40 Kahn again uses only on e source: 
an article by Quester that ignores m any  
im portant econom ic considerations.)
B ut this is the characteristic style 
of H erm an Kahn H e has prepared a 
“ladder of escalation,” labelled  the  
“rungs,” and then speculated w ith  res­
pect to either largely unsubstantiated  
claims about the past or to “m etophors 
and scenarios” w hich, since they are 
of his ow n m aking, he can hardly  be 
congratulated on studying in  depth. 
T o m ake a book from his theories he  
m ust then push the w orld and its 
leaders in to  the frames of his m aking, 
discounting at every “rung” th e  possi­
b ility  that his scenario m ay not be  
plausible in  its entirety . (Accidental 
War leading to the form ation of a 
World governm ent is “not . . . w ildly  
im plausible” to Kahn though he  
doesn’t say why not; nor does he say 
why Pearl Harbor and the  act of 
violating Belgian neutrality  in  1914 
Were sim ilar in their “savage” break 
of “ the conventions of war.”)
In  fact so m uch of Kahn's book is 
Unacceptable one cannot really  get to 
terms w ith  his general conclusion —
that any nuclear war w ill be in ten ­
tional rather than accidental and that 
he has the key to the forms any ordered  
escalation m ay take. H is previous work 
was called T h in k in g  a bou t th e U n­
th in kable  (and included  the  confes­
sion he w ould n ot like to defend  
America's justifiable loss in Wforld  War
III being 60,000,000, his figure, “in  
the give and take of p ub lic  debate”) 
but Kahn is not even a skilfu l thinker. 
H is theory is all from  the top o f his 
head, because we h aven’t had  a h o lo ­
caust ye t, yet lack of such experience  
surely doesn't necessitate ignoring pre­
cedent to such a degree that previous 
wars and crises are instructive only to 
the extent that they show us how  d if­
ferent, and how m uch m ore orderly  
nuclear war w ill be: use o f  nuclear 
weapons, for instance, is seen as a 
quantitative not qualitative alteration  
to the nature o f a conventional war 
or “agreed b attle” — one can only as­
sum e, in  this case, that a pushbutton  
war w ill sim ply not m ove the public  
as other wars m ight and that they  
shall accept all that their leaders do 
and say. In fact the sim ultaneous p u b ­
lication  in  Penguin  of a savagely  
abridged Clausewitz On W ar  dem on­
strates, and clearly, how  strategy has 
not been forced away from precedent 
by the development, o f nuclear w eap­
ons. And one has only to look at the 
article Talenski, the R ussian theorist, 
has w ritten on  “T h e  Character of 
M odern W ar” (In tern a tion a l Affairs, 
Moscow, 1960) to see just how  u n ­
necessary and callous K ahn’s hard  
truths really are
As to the edition: the im plications 
that the revisions to the 1965 text, the 
consequence of a trip to V ietnam , 
make the revised ed ition  m ore up  to 
date are qu ite  m isleading and the in ­
dexing is, if not arbitrary, irritatingly  
selective.
C a r l  H a r r i s o n - F o r d
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